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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOIS CROWDER, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
body politic, 
Case No. 14405 
Defendant and 
Appellant, 
and JOHN DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injury caused by 
an automobile accident in Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the 
ground that Plaintiff failed to file notice of claim 
within 90 days as required by the Utah Governmental 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 (1967). Plain-
tiff filed an Amended Complaint, admitted that notice 
had not been timely filed, but alleged that the notice 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are 
unconstitutional as applied to counties. 
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and 
filed a Memorandum Decision declaring that the 90 day 
notice requirement violates equal protection of the 
laws and is unconstitutional. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the trial court's ' 
Order denying its Motion to Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS < 
Plaintiff was injured when the automobile she was 
operating collided with a bridge abutment owned by 
i 
Salt Lake County. The accident occurred October 28, 
1974. 
Plaintiff did not give written notice of her claim | 
to Salt Lake County until April 3, 1975, 65 days beyond 
the 90 day notice period. Subsequently, Plaintiff 
I 
9 
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filed this action alleging that the county highway 
was negligently designed and lacked proper signs# 
markers, reflectors and lighting. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITIES ARE RATIONALLY RELATED 
TO A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL OBJEC-
TIVE. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court have consistently held that legislation 
may discriminate between classes of individuals if 
the classification is reasonable and has some rational 
relation to a legitimate legislative objective. E.g., 
San Antonio Independent School v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 40 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-
79 (1911); State v. Warwick, 11 Utah 2d 116, 355 P.2d 
703 (1960); Wein v. Crockett, 115 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 
222 (1948). 
In recent years the courts have applied a two-
tiered approach to analysis of equal protection claims. 
If the classification is based on a "suspect criterion", 
3 
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or affects a "fundamental interest", the statute will 
be scrutinized closely and will not be upheld unless 
necessary for a "compelling state interest". 
Suspect criteria include race, Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); and national origin, 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
Fundamental rights include the right to vote, 
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 
621, 626-27 (1969), the right to travel,Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969), the right to 
procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942), and the right to marry, Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
Conversely, if the classification is not "sus-
pect" and the right affected is not "fundamental", 
all doubts will be resolved in favor of the legisla-
tion and it will be upheld unless the classification 
is wholly irrelevent to the purpose of the statute. 
As the United States Supreme Court held in McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); 
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Although no precise formula has been 
developed, the Court has held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a 
wide scope of discretion in enacting laws 
which affect some groups of citizens dif-
ferently than others. The constitutional 
safeguard is offended only if the classifi-
cation rests on grounds wholly irrelevant 
to the achievement of the State's objective. 
State legislatures are presumed to have 
acted within their constitutional power 
despite the fact that, in practice, their 
laws result in some inequality. A statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any 
state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it. (emphasis added) 
The Court should, therefore, look to the purposes 
of the notice statute. If any set of facts can be 
conceived which would justify a discrimination between 
different governmental entities, the statute should 
be upheId. 
Generally, the notice provisions require that a 
claim be filed within a specified time. The time is 
one year for the state , and 90 days for other governmental 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12: A claim against the state or 
any agency thereof as defined herein shall be forever 
barred unless notice thereof is filed with the attorney 
general of the state of Utah and the agency concerned 
within one year after the cause of action arises. 
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entities , except that suits against a city for a 
defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any 
3 
highway, road, etc., can be filed within six months . 
After the claim is filed the entity has 90 days 
to allow or reject the claim. If the claim is re-
jected or the 90 day period expires, the individual 
may then bring suit within one year after the rejec-
tion or the end of the 90 day period. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13: A claim against a polit-
ical subdivision shall be forever barred unless 
notice thereof is filed within ninety days after 
the cause of action arises; . . -
Utah Code Ann. §10-7-77: Every claim against a city 
or incorporated town for damages or injury, alleged 
to have been caused by the defective, unsafe, dan-
gerous or obstructed condition of any street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge of such city 
or town, or from the negligence of the city or town 
authorities in respect to any such street, alley, 
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall within 
six months after the happening of such injury or 
damage be presented to the board of commissioners 
or city council of such city, or board of trustees 
of such town, . . . 
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There are numerous purposes for notice statutes. 
Among them are the following: 
1. A requirement of notice provides the 
governmental entity with the opportunity to set-
tle meritorious claims before suit is instituted, 
thus avoiding needless litigation and legal ex-
pense. 
2. A requirement of notice provides the 
governmental entity with an opportunity to investi-
gate claims while the evidence is still fresh and 
thereby to avoid stale and fraudulent claims. 
3. A requirement of notice allows the gov-
ernmental entity to make prompt repairs of danger-
ous defects, thereby avoiding other injuries and 
resultant suits. 
4. A requirement of notice facilitates 
budgeting and tax planning* 
5. Notice requirements generally facilitate 
the orderly and expeditious administration of 
public business. 
7 
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Some of these purposes were discussed by this 
Court in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 
492 P.2d 1335 (1972), where the Court pointed out the 
problems in not requiring notice: 
The unsatisfactory aspects of such a situation: 
Deprivation of the city of an opportunity to make 
a prompt investigation of the particular case, 
and if any defect is found to exist to remedy it; 
the possibility that changes may have occurred 
in the material circumstances; and the carry-over 
to subsequent city administrations of responsibil-
ity for accidents that may have previously occurred, 
are sufficiently obvious not to require further 
elaboration. 
492 P.2d at 1335. 
The need for each of these objectives may vary 
between governmental entities. Some of the differences 
between these entities may be classified as follows: 
A. Geographical and Population Differences 
The state's responsibility extends over a large 
geographical area and its affairs are administered 
through numerous rather complex agencies, involving 
thousands of employees. Although a rural county may 
extend over a large area, it may have a smaller popula-
tion and fewer employees involved in the administration 
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of governmental affairs. A county, therefore, may 
reasonably require a shorter notice period since 
there may be no other way for the county personnel 
to promptly discover and correct defective conditions. 
Although a city is geographically more compact 
than a county, it may have more miles of roadway to 
maintain, a more extensive water and sewer service, 
expanded welfare and health services, more numerous 
schools, etc, and, therefore, require more complex 
agencies to administer its duties to a larger popula-
tion, than a large sparsely populated county whose 
governmental functions are less complex, in which case 
a shorter notice period would be reasonable. 
B. Differences in Services 
The services performed by different governmental 
entities vary greatly in nature and complexity. The 
state performs such services as employment security, 
industrial regulation, higher education, insurance 
regulation, National Guard, liquor control, Highway 
Patrol, fish and game regulation, and a host of other 
services not provided by any other governmental entity. 
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Because of the complexity of the state government 
a citizen may reasonably require a longer period 
to formulate and present a claim. A citizen of a 
small city can easily present a claim to the city 
when it has only a few employees and the city hall 
is in close proximaty to the citizen's home; con-
versely, if the citizen is injured by an agency of 
the state he may reasonably require a somewhat longer 
period to identify the involved agency and to pre-
sent and process his grievance. Practical experience 
demonstrates that it necessarily requires considerably 
longer for the citizen to attempt an administrative 
solution to his problem where the state bureaucracy 
is involved than where a local governmental entity is 
concerned. The legislature undoubtedly took into 
account the fact that distances usually involved in 
dealing with the state governmental agencies generally 
prevent the personal and more expeditious handling of 
citizens' grievances. 
C. Differences in Budgeting and Revenues 
The budgeting problems of the state, the various 
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counties, and the cities and towns are wholly differ-
ent. The statefs broad tax base and annual budget 
sessions permit financial projections on an annual 
basis. Cities and counties have considerably more 
restricted sources of revenue and so their problems 
in projecting budgetary needs are different. The im-
pact of a large claim or judgment upon the state as 
compared to a school district, a small city or rural 
county is different. The variation in notice require-
ments materially assists the various governmental en-
tities to take into account the potential financial 
requirements to satisfy claims which have been timely 
filed. 
D. Differences in Manpower 
The state with its large manpower force is in a 
position to more easily avoid fraudulent claims through 
thorough investigation of claims than can the small 
city. The shorter claim period applicable to a city 
or county with more limited facilities is entirely ap-
propriate and necessary to permit an earlier identifi-
cation of the claims and investigation, which can be 
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done more economically and effectively than after a 
lapse of a longer period. 
Similarly, the cost and impact of litigation 
is more significant to the school district or a small 
city which has no staff attorney, or the rural county 
where no attorney resides, than would the same liti-
gation to the state which maintains the largest 
single staff of attorneys in Utah. 
Although it would be impossible for the legisla-
ture to take into account every possible variation or 
difference between the numerous governmental entities 
within the state, those noted demonstrate the reasonable-
ness of providing different notice periods for the 
general categories of governmental entities. 
In fact, the legislature would have been justi-
fied in establishing further refinements in notice re-
quirements as between different cities based on popula-
tion, geographical area, and so forth. That the legis-
lature did not choose to do so was its prerogative. 
The classification relating to the various notice re-
quirements rests upon relevant considerations to achieve 
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legitimate state purposes. The United States Supreme 
Court stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U.S. 483, 489 (1955): 
The problem of legislative classification 
is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire 
definition. Evils in the same field may be of 
different dimensions and proportions, requiring 
different remedies. Or so the legislature may 
think . . . Or the reform may take one step at 
a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legisla-
tive mind. . . The legislature may select one 
phase of one field and apply a remedy there, 
neglecting the others . . . The prohibition of 
the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than 
the invidious discrimination. (citations omitted) 
POINT II. THE LEGISLATURE MAY IMPOSE REASONABLE 
RESTRICTIONS IN WAIVING GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity predates the 
founding of the State of Utah, and the founding of 
the United States. See e.g., Black v. Rempublicam, 
1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792). 
This doctrine is part of the common law and has 
been consistently followed by this Court. Holt v. 
Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 
1286 (1973); Hampton v. State, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 
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I 
708 (1968) ; Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 
Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); jopes v. Salt 
Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 297, 343 P.2d 728 (1959); 
State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 21, 286 P.2d 785 
(1955); Hojorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 
P.2d 907 (1952); Bingham v. Board of Education, 
118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950); Campbell Building 
Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 
857 (1937); State Road Commission v. Fourth District 
Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937); Wilkinson 
v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913). 
Although frequently called upon to do so, the 
Court forbore altering this doctrine because to do 
so is a legislative matter. As the Court held in 
Hojorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907, 
909 (1953) : 
This phase of our law is well established 
and of long standing. If it is to be changed, 
that must come through the sovereign power of 
this commonwealth, the people, speaking through 
the Legislature. 
In 1965 the legislature responded by enacting 
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the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-1, et seq. (1967). 
This Act waives governmental immunity, subject 
to limitations in amount, §63-30-34; reservations 
as to types of actions, §§63-30-5 to 10; the proced-
ural requirements of notice, §§63-30-11 to 15, and 
the filing of an undertaking, §63-30-19. 
The plaintiff now wishes to take advantage of 
the waiver of immunity as provided in the Act, with-
out complying with the procedural requirements of the 
Act. It is fair to assume that the legislature did 
not intend one to be operative without the other. 
This Court, in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 
27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972), acknowledged the application 
of this concept in the following language: 
The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity which 
would ordinarily protect the City from such 
a suit was part of the common law and thus 
part of the body of law which was assimilated 
into the law of this jurisdiction at statehood. 
The allowance of a claim against the city for 
injuries which may be suffered because of the 
". . -defective, unsafe, dangerous . . . condi-
tion of any street . . ." is a statutorily 
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created exception to the Doctrine of Sovereign 
Immunity. Inasmuch as the maintenance of such 
a cause of action derives from such statutory 
authority, a prerequisite thereto is meeting 
the conditions prescribed in the statute. A 
party seeking to obtain the benefit thereof 
should not be entitled to claim the favorable 
aspects which confer the rights, and disavow 
the conditions upon which the rights are predi-
cated . (emphasis added) 
27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 1337-38 (1972). See 
also, Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 
N.E.2d 866 (1952); Brantley v. Dallas, 498 S.W.2d 
452 (Tex. Cir. App. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 983 
(1974). 
POINT III. DIFFERING NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
HAVE BEEN DECLARED CONSTITU-
TIONAL . 
Defendant has been unable to find any reported 
case in which notice requirements were found unconsti-
tutional because they differed as between governmental 
entities. 
The only case which has ever treated the exact 
issue raised here is Bleamaster v. County of Los Angeles, 
11 Cal. Rptr. 214 (Cal. App. 1961). There the Court held: 
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The distinction between a county and a city 
is a sufficient basis for a distinction in 
classification for the purpose of establish-
ing a procedure for the enforcement of the 
right of a property owner to recover compen-
sation for the taking or damaging of property 
for public use. Sections 29702 and 29704 of 
the Government Code apply equally to all per-
sons who have claims against a county, and 
said sections apply equally to all counties. 
The sections are not within the prohibitions 
of the state Constitution or the federal Con-
stitution upon the asserted basis that they 
apply only to claims against counties or upon 
the asserted basis that they do not apply to 
similar claims against cities. 
In other contexts most states have held that distinc-
tions between cities and counties, as well as dis-
tinctions between governmental entities based on pop-
ulation are reasonable. E.g., Lockwood v. State, 
462 S.W.2d 465 (Ark. 1971); People v. Public Building 
Comm'n., 238 N.E.2d 390 (111. 1968); Dortch v. Luger, 
266 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. 1971); Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 
S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1972). 
It is true that three state courts, Michigan, 
Nevada, and Washington, have overturned notice statutes,but 
on an entirely different basis: that any discrimination 
between individuals injured by governmental tort-feasors 
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and those injured by private tort-feasors is consti-
tutionally impermissible. Reich v. State Highway 
Dept., 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner 
v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 (Nev. 1973); Hunter v. North 
Mason High School, 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975). 
These three cases, however, share a common error. 
Each assumes that the purpose of their respective 
legislative schemes is to put governments on an equal 
footing with private tort-feasors. For example in 
Hunter the Washington Court said: 
The state's waiver of tort immunity is 
unbridled by procedural conditions pertaining 
to the consent to be sued. 
539 P.2d at 850. 
And in Turner, the Nevada Court said: 
The stated object of NRS 41.031 is to 
waive the immunity of governmental units and 
agencies from liability for injuries caused 
by their negligent conduct, thus putting them 
on an equal footing with private tort-feasors. 
510 P.2d at 882 
in Reich, the Michigan court said: 
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[Cjontrary to the legislature's intention to 
place victims of negligent conduct on an equal 
footing, the notice requirement . . . bars the 
actions of victims of governmental negligence 
after only 60 days. 
194 N.W.2d at 702. 
The error of this analysis is obvious: _I_f the 
legislature had intended to place governmental tort-
feasors and private tort-feasors on an exactly equal 
basis, they would not have adopted the notice require-
ment in the first place. 
The Idaho Supreme Court very recently considered 
this problem in Newlan v. State, 535 P.2d 1348 (Ida. 
1975) and held: 
We find the opinion in Reich to be highly 
conclusory without any consideration of the 
rationale for such notice statute, nor any real 
analysis of the equal protection problem. We 
are not persuaded by that authority. 
We find Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 
(Nev. 1973) to be equally unpersuasive. . . 
We believe the opinions of the Michigan 
and Nevada courts are contrary to the weight of 
authority. Most states have consistently re-
jected similar constitutional attacks. 
535 P.2d at 1352. 
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Other cases upholding notice requirements are 
Artukovich v. Astendorf, 131 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1942); 
and Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1973). 
It should also be noted that if the analysis 
of the Reich, Hunter and Turner cases is adopted, 
then any discrimination between governmental and 
private tort-feasors is impermissible and the entire 
Governmental Immunity Act is invalid; the Court 
would have to overrule a long line of cases uphold-
ing governmental immunity; even a different statute 
of limitations or venue provision would be unconsti-
tutional. 
As this Court held in Wilcox v. Salt Lake City, 
26 Utah 2d 78, 484 P.2d 1200 (1971): 
[p]laintiffs . . . seem to say that . . . 
we should judicially abolish the doctrine 
altogether as being archaic and doing so 
judicially to legislate our Governmental 
Immunity Act out of existence. This last 
contention we are not inclined to espouse, 
in spite of a claimed trend in that direc-
tion, noted by plaintiffs' adversions to 
scholarly papers written by eminent educators, 
and the judicial pronouncements of some sister 
states. 
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POINT IV. THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY UPHELD 
THE APPLICABILITY OF EACH OF THE 
NOTICE PROVISIONS. 
The Constitutionality of the notice provisions 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has been as-
sumed by this Court as each of the provisions has 
been applied without question. 
In Scarsborough v. Granite School District, 
531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), the 90 day requirement was 
upheld as to school districts; in Varoz v. Sevey, 
29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973), the 90 day re-
quirement was applied to a county. 
In Roosendall Const. & Mining Corp. v. Holman, 
28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972), the one-year 
notice provision was applied. 
in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 
492 P.2d 1335 (1972), the 30 day notice provision 
was upheld against a challenge on equal protection 
grounds. Section 10-7-77 has since been amended so 
as to make the filing time six months rather than 
30 days. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These statutes were explained and clarified in 
Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 
1975). 
POINT V. THE COURT SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS 
OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE LEGIS-
LATURE . 
The trial judge's Memorandum Decision, without 
citation of a single authority, held that: 
The differences between state, counties 
and cities are not, in my opinion, such as to 
require different periods for filing notice 
of claim. Their respective needs for investi-
gating such claims and correcting defects do 
not differ. 
Unfortunately, the trial judge's Opinion does 
not provide guidance as to which one, if any, of the 
time periods does apply. Rather, the judge says: 
It is not for this Court to fix a time 
period within which such claims must be filed, 
as such is for legislative determination. 
If only the difference in time periods is un-
constitutional, why should the 90 day provision be 
struck down? If all governmental entities must use 
0 9 
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the same notice period, how can this Court deter-
mine whether the period should be 90 days, six 
months, or one year? 
It is respectfully suggested that only the 
legislature, who studied this problem carefully, 
is in a position to determine which time period 
applies, and they have already spoken in enacting the 
three separate periods. It should be noted that the 
trial court found the notice provisions unconstitu-
tional without relying on any evidence or any case 
dealing directly with the subject. The trial court's 
ruling is one opinion to be weighed against that of 
the entire legislature of this state. 
The Indiana Supreme Court said, in sustaining 
legislation that distinguished between cities and 
towns: 
Legitimate reasons for a different treat-
ment between cities and towns can often arise 
and it is not the function of this Court to 
ferret out the motive of the legislature in 
passing this legislation. 
Crider v. State, 282 N.E.2d 819, 823(ind. 1972). 
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CONCLUSION 
In waiving governmental immunity the legisla-
ture had the right to impose reasonable limitations 
and procedural restrictions. After careful study 
the legislature determined that three separate notice 
provisions should be used for different governmental 
entities. It is not the function of this Court to 
second-guess the legislature or to substitute its own 
judgment for that of the legislature. Rather this 
Court should enforce the legislation unless distinc-
tions made are wholly irrelevent to the object of the 
legislation. 
There are good and valid reasons why different 
governmental entities require a different time for 
notice. Consequently, the legislation should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW £ CHRISTENSEN 
\ fL ^ •••-f <? j£_a 
Merlin R. Lybber t 
V Scott Daniels 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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